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Abstract
The protection of an alien’s property in a host country against direct expro-
priation has long existed in the international arena. Examples of direct expro-
priation include nationalization, physical seizure of assets or legislated transfer 
of assets to the state.  However such physical takings are no longer common 
practice. Nowadays, expropriation comes mainly in the form of “indirect ex-
propriation”: acts  and steps taken by governments which interfere with the 
right to the property or diminish the value of the property.
This paper explores the most relevant antecedents of the concept of indirect 
expropriation, its appearance in the international system, the inclusion in BITs 
and Investment Chapters of FTAs, and the effect that the concept is having on 
the regulatory activity of governments 
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Resumen 
La protección de la propiedad en contra de medidas de expropiación directa 
ha existido en el ámbito internacional, ejemplos de expropiación directa inclu-
yen nacionalización, apropiación física de activos y la transferencia forzada 
de bienes. 
En la actualidad la práctica de la expropiación directa dejó de ser común, la 
expropiación se presenta bajo la forma de “expropiación indirecta”: medidas 
adoptadas por un gobierno que interfieren con el derecho de propiedad o el 
valor de la misma.   
El presente escrito explora los antecedentes más relevantes del concepto de 
expropiación indirecta, su aparición en el sistema internacional, su inclusión 
en Acuerdos Bilaterales de Protección y Promoción de la Inversión Extranjera 
y en tratados de Libre Comercio, y los efectos que ha tenido el concepto en la 
actividad reguladora de gobiernos.
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El Concepto de “Expropiación Indirecta”, su aparición en el 
sistema internacional y sus efectos en la actividad regulatoria 
de los gobiernos. 
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Introduction 
Over the last 40 years, states have expe-
rienced an increase of foreign investment1. In 
order to regulate and protect such investment, 
countries have established networks of Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with Investment Protection 
Chapters which contain BIT-like provisions.
The protection of an alien’s property in 
a host country against direct expropriation has 
long existed in the international arena. Exam-
ples of direct expropriation include national-
ization, physical seizure of assets by the state 
and forced or legislated transfer of assets to 
the state.  However such physical takings are 
no longer common practice. Nowadays, expro-
priation comes mainly in the form of “indirect 
expropriation”: the measures taken by govern-
ments which interfere with the right to the prop-
erty or diminish the value of the property2.
The phenomenon of indirect expropria-
tion earned notoriety in the international con-
text with the BIT-like provisions of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 
1993.  Foreign investors began to rely on these 
provisions to file high-profile lawsuits against 
the governments on grounds of indirect expro-
priation3.
However, indirect expropriation has a 
heritage that pre-dates NAFTA.  This paper ex-
plores the most relevant antecedents of the con-
cept, its appearance in the international system 
and the effect that the interpretation of the term 
by lawyers and arbitral tribunals is having on 
the regulatory activity of governments in regu-
lating matters of public interest.
The paper does an overview about the 
concept of indirect expropriation, Next it re-
views the key predecessors that influenced the 
development of today’s concept of “indirect ex-
propriation”. We then move on to review the in-
clusion of the concept in chapter 11 of NAFTA. 
Finally, the paper sets out some recent arbitral 
awards in which arbitral tribunals have ruled on 
claims of indirect expropriation which highlight 
the limitations that  this concept now imposes 
on states’ ability to regulate.
1. Overview of indirect expropriation
Clauses protecting investors against ex-
propriation have evolved to encompass indirect 
expropriation.  In general terms, indirect expro-
priation “occurs when there is an interference 
by the state in the use, enjoyment, or benefits 
derived from a property even when the property 
is not seized and the legal title of the property 
is not affected”4. (It should be noted that this 
overarching definition is merely illustrative and 
too wide for practical application.  The general 
rule for identifying an indirect expropriation is 
still on a case by case basis)5.
In practice, protection against indirect ap-
propriation means a foreign investor is entitled 
to file a claim against a host state on the grounds 
that the state when exercising its regulatory 
powers (e.g. a law, decree, decision or other in-
terference) is depriving him, wholly or partially, 
of his property, even if the state has not physi-
cally seized the asset.  Under such protection, 
an investor can sue for economic loss caused by 
a state’s action which affects his property.
NAFTA, which is not a BIT as such but 
contains an investment protection chapter writ-
ten in a similar way as a BIT, marked an impor-
tant stage for the protection of foreign invest-
ments. Under this treaty foreign investors were 
able to impinge on governments’ ability to reg-
ulate and also because it brought to the attention 
of the public the side effects of the protection to 
foreign investors against expropriation6.
Legal scholars as well as several inter-
national arbitrators have pointed out that the 
clauses contained in BITs or the foreign invest-
ment chapters of FTAs are too wide and vague 
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which leaves the interpretation of the scope of 
protection to the discretion of arbitrators7. 
The concept of indirect expropriation has 
given rise to new concerns about its scope of 
application and the uncertainty about what ex-
actly constitutes an indirect expropriation. It 
has become difficult to define which govern-
mental measures have a sufficiently severe ad-
verse effect on someone’s right to property or 
the profitability of their investment to result in 
an indirect expropriation8.
2. The origins of indirect expropriation
Although the concept of indirect ex-
propriation gained particular importance and 
relevance after its inclusion in Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA, it was pre-dated by various anteced-
ents: i) decisions taken by international tribu-
nals, ii) attempts to codify it, iii) the inclusion 
of the term in previous treaties and iv)the un-
derpinning provided by the theory of Richard 
Epstein.
2.1. Decisions of International Tribunals:
The following are the most relevant deci-
sions of International Tribunals that have influ-
enced the concept of indirect expropriation: 
2.1.1. Controversy of the United King-
dom and the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies (1838):
In 1838, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
granted a monopoly of extraction and ex-
portation of Sicilian sulphur to a single 
company and to the exclusion of all other 
companies.
Some of those excluded companies be-
longed to United Kingdom nationals. 
Even though their companies owned sul-
phur deposits and reserves, they were pre-
vented by law from trading their sulphur 
because of the terms of the monopoly.
In 1840, after strong pressure from the 
United Kingdom (which included the 
threat of force) the Sicilian authorities 
cancelled the monopoly agreement9. An 
international panel of 5 commissioners 
(two English, two Neapolitans and one 
French) was set up to resolve the claims 
of those English citizens adversely affect-
ed by the granting of the monopoly. 
The commission granted compensation to 
the owners of sulphur mines, the suppli-
ers of sulphur and those that before the 
monopoly contract came into force had 
bought sulphur in Sicily who had been 
prevented from exporting their product. 
The argument used by the Tribunal was 
that granting a monopoly to a single com-
pany had affected their property rights 
causing economic loss10.
In this case, compensation was awarded 
despite the fact that the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies had not physically taken over 
the sulphur mines or contracts of the Brit-
ish companies.  Thus, in this very early 
case, an indirect interference was enough 
to entitle investors to request for econom-
ic compensation for economic loss.
2.1.2. German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice. (1919)
This dispute concerned a nitrate factory 
located in the Polish city of Chorzów. 
In 1915, the German Government con-
cluded a contract with Bayrische Stick-
stoffwerke A.-G. (“the Contractor”), ac-
cording to which the Contractor would 
construct a nitrate factory at Chorzów in 
Upper Silesia11. The German Government 
would be the owner of the factory.
In addition, it was agreed that the Con-
tractor would manage (operate the facto-
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ry?) nitrate operations from 1915 to 1941. 
The Contractor, through a special corpo-
rate entity set up for this purpose, had the 
right to use all the patents, licenses and 
experience arising out of the nitrate op-
eration at Chorzów12.
In 1919 the German Government trans-
ferred the title of factory to a new Ger-
man Corporation called Oberschlesische 
Stickstoffwerke A.-G (“the Title Hol-
der”)13. The Contractor’s contractual right 
to manage the factory and to use the pat-
ents, licenses, experiences and contracts 
were assigned to the new owner14.
In 1920, the Polish Government issued a 
law transferring the title of the factory and 
the land from the Title Holder to the Pol-
ish Treasury15.  
In 1922, the Polish Government issued a 
ministerial decree authorizing a delegate 
of the Polish Government to take control 
of the activities of the nitrate factory and 
possession of the movable property, li-
censes, and patents16.
The Permanent Court of Justice ruled 
that by taking possession of the Chorzów 
factory, and operating it, the Polish Gov-
ernment had unlawfully expropriated 
the contractual rights of the Contractor, 
including the right of remuneration for 
the administration of the factory, and the 
right of use experiments, patents, and li-
censes17. This case is another example, 
pre-dating the first ever BIT, where un-
lawful expropriation encompassed more 
than physical seizure of assets.
2.1.3. International Claims Commi-
ssion-Foreign Claims Settlement 
Commission. (1949)
The International Claims Commission 
was established in the USA by the In-
ternational Claims Act of 1949 and was 
intended to provide compensation to 
American nationals whose property was 
nationalized or subject to other “taking” 
by a foreign government18. In 1954, these 
responsibilities were assumed by the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission19. 
During the 1950s, the Commission de-
cided several cases regarding either direct 
expropriations or expropriation caused by 
measures adopted by governments which 
affected the right to property.
One relevant case regarding indirect ex-
propriation was Alberta Bela Reet. In 
1950, nine years before the first BIT, the 
Government of Hungary prohibited “the 
sale, the placing of liens upon or the oc-
cupancy of a dwelling house and its court 
yard”20. The Commission ruled that the 
restriction on the free use of the property 
was an expropriation even though the title 
of the property was never transferred to 
the Hungarian government21.
The Commission has pointed out in sev-
eral opinions that the transfer of title to the 
state was not a sine qua non requirement 
for an expropriation. Therefore restric-
tions on the right to use a certain property 
by regulations issued by the state hosting 
the investment and forced sales were also 
been deemed to be expropriations22.
2.1.4.   Poehlmann v Kulmbacher Spinneri 
United States Court of Restitution 
Appeals (1952)23.
In this case, a German citizen who was 
married to a Jewish woman, was the own-
er of a were very popular Hotel in Kulm-
bach. When the Nazis came to power, it 
became socially unacceptable for party 
members to visit the hotel and restaurant. 
Instead, they began publicly criticising 
the venue24.
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The business started to decline and so the 
owner sold the hotel. The Court of Resti-
tution25 held that the hotel had been “con-
fiscated” and ordered restitution in favour 
of the original hotel owner26.
In this case, well before states started to 
execute BITs, the government’s conduct 
fell far short of direct expropriation.  In-
deed, its indirect expropriation did not 
even result from an exercise of formal 
government or regulatory power.  Nev-
ertheless, the state’s activities were held 
to be  expropriations because its public 
criticism and disapproval resulted in eco-
nomic loss to the claimant’s business.
The above-mentioned cases have been es-
sential in the development of the concept of in-
direct expropriation which came to be included 
in BITs and FTAs.
2.2. Early attempts of codification 
Since the 1950s, the principles referred to 
in the above mentioned cases were also starting 
to be codified.  The key texts, drafted after the 
first BIT was signed, are as follows:
2.2.1. Harvard Draft Convention on the 
International Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens (1961)
In 1953, the General Assembly of the Unit-
ed Nations requested The International 
Law Commission to codify the principles 
of International Law governing state re-
sponsibility, (the “Harvard Draft”)27.
The Harvard Law School undertook this 
task and appointed Professors Sohn and 
Baxter and a distinguished advisory com-
mittee28. 
Although the purpose was not specifically 
focused on the protection of foreign in-
vestments, the Harvard Draft nevertheless 
covered the issue.  Article 10 paragraph 3 
of the Draft defined a taking of property 
as follows:
“A taking of property includes not only an 
outright taking of property but also any 
such unreasonable interference with the 
use, enjoyment, or disposal of property 
as to justify an inference that the owner 
thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or 
dispose of the property within a reason-
able period of time after the inception of 
such interference”29.
This wording clearly applies to indirect 
expropriation, since it uses the words “not 
only an outright taking…but also...un-
reasonable interference”. In essence, the 
Harvard Draft provided that a “taking” 
happens when, without reasonable justi-
fication, the right to use, enjoy or dispose 
of a property was restricted30.
The concept of indirect expropriation also 
receives explicit recognition in paragraph 
5 of the Harvard Draft, which defines law-
ful taking and in which direct and indirect 
expropriation as separate concepts.  
Paragraph 5 of the Harvard Draft states 
that: 
“An uncompensated taking of an alien’s 
property or a deprivation of the use or en-
joyment of property of an alien which re-
sults from the execution of tax laws; from 
a general change in the value of curren-
cy; from the action of the competent au-
thorities of the State in the maintenance of 
public order, health or morality; or from 
the valid exercise of belligerent rights or 
otherwise incidental to the normal opera-
tion of the laws of the State shall not be 
considered wrongful”31.
The differentiation between “a depriva-
tion of the use or enjoyment of property” 
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and a “taking of an alien’s property” gives 
equal status to both indirect expropriation 
and direct takings.. 
The Harvard Draft was never adopted, as 
was also the way with later attempts at codifica-
tion such as the OECD Draft or the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments (MAI).  Neverthe-
less, the proposed definition using the term 
“unreasonable interference” is an illustration 
of how the concept of indirect expropriation 
had come to the fore and how far its boundaries 
could be pushed in theory.
2.2.2. The OECD Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property 
(1967)
The OECD Draft Convention on the Pro-
tection of Foreign Property 1967 (the 
“OECD Draft”) was developed upon the 
instructions of the Council of the Orga-
nization for European Co-operation in 
April, 1960. The aim was to strengthen 
international economic co-operation32.
Article 3 of the OECD Draft included a 
prohibition against indirect expropriation 
as follows:
 “Article 3: TAKING OF PROPERTY: 
No Party shall take any measures, depri-
ving, directly or indirectly, of his property 
a national of another Party unless the fo-
llowing are complied with:
(i) The measures are taken in the public 
interest and under due process of law;
(ii) The measures are not discriminatory 
or contrary to any undertaking which 
the former Party may have given; and
(iii) The measures are accompanied by 
provision for the payment of just 
compensations. Such compensations 
shall represent the genuine value of 
the property affected, shall be paid 
without undue delay, and shall be 
transferable to the extent necessary 
to make it effective for the national 
entitled thereto”33.
According to the explanatory commen-
tary of this article that accompanied the 
OECD Draft, the state has a sovereign 
right to take over the property of nation-
als or aliens. However, this right is lim-
ited and must fulfil the following require-
ments: (i) the taking must be in public 
interest, (ii) must not be discriminatory, 
and (iii) there must be payment of a just 
and effective compensation34.  
The above-mentioned articles show that 
the OECD Draft further developed the 
concept of indirect expropriation by ex-
plicit use of the world “indirectly”  and 
considered indirect expropriations on a 
par with direct takings. 
Again, as in the case of the Harvard Draft, 
this draft did not reach fruition, but nev-
ertheless is an indicator and a clear prec-
edent of the developing BIT context at the 
time it was drafted in 1967.  
These were the first two attempts to in-
clude the protection against indirect expropria-
tion in international treaties35.
2.3. Early Codifications
Following these forerunners, the concept 
of indirect expropriation was formally intro-
duced into international treaties through the US 
BITs program and in the Free Trade Agreement 
between Canada and the United States.  
2.3.1. US Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Program (1980)
The next important development of the 
concept of indirect expropriation was the 
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US Bilateral Investment Treaties Program 
of 1980. This plan was a response to the 
US and its investors’ lack of confidence 
in judges, courts (in general the legal sys-
tem) of developing countries36. 
Under this plan, the Reagan administra-
tion entered into a vast number of BITs with de-
veloping countries which included the concept 
of indirect expropriation.  For example, article 
IV of the BIT between Panama and the USA 
signed in 1982 (which came into force in 1990) 
provides that:
“Investment of a national or a company 
of either Party shall not be expropriated, na-
tionalized, or subjected to any other direct or 
indirect measure having an effect equivalent to 
expropriation of nationalization (“expropria-
tion”) in the territory of the other Party, except 
for a public or social purpose; in a non-dis-
criminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation; and in 
accordance with due process and the general 
principles of treatment laid down in Article 
II(2). Such compensation shall amount to the 
full value of the expropriated investment imme-
diately before the expropriatory action became 
known; include interest at a commercially rea-
sonable rate; be paid without delay; be effec-
tively realizable; and be freely transferable37.”
The definition of expropriation in this 
clause includes “indirect measure[s] having 
an effect equivalent to … nationalization”.  It 
is likely that this formulation was replicated 
in many BITs in the 1980s under this US pro-
gramme.  As will be seen later in this paper, it 
is also a precursor to the very similarly drafted 
expropriation clause in NAFTA.
2.3.2.  Free Trade Agreement of Canada 
and the United States of 1988 
(FTACUS)
The most recent predecessor of NAFTA 
is the Free Trade Agreement of Canada 
and the United States of 1988 (FTACUS). 
FTACUS was intended to eliminate bar-
riers, facilitate favourable conditions for 
investment, and establish clear proce-
dures for the settlement of disputes38.
This treaty was pioneering in that it in-
cluded an Investment Chapter (Chapter 
XVI), defining issues of expropriation, 
taxation, transfer (of any profit, royalty, 
fee, interests or other earning from an in-
vestment ) and dispute resolution. Article 
1605 of the treaty addresses the issue of 
indirect expropriation as follows:
“Neither Party shall directly or indirectly 
nationalize or expropriate an investment 
in its territory by an investor of the other 
Party or take any measure or series of 
measures tantamount to an expropriation 
of such an investment, except:
a) for a public purpose;
b) in accordance with due process of law;
c) on a non-discriminatory basis; and
d) upon payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation at fair market 
value39”.
This treaty was the first international in-
struments to include the concept of “Indirect 
Expropriation”.  However, no high profile law-
suits arose from any of these treaties prior to 
NAFTA.  
Notably, the expression “tantamount to an 
expropriation” as used in FTACUS is broader 
than “equivalent to an expropriation”, as used 
in the US-Panama BIT under the US BITs pro-
gramme.  Thus, it suggests that FTACUS was a 
further development of the concept of indirect 
expropriation.
2.3.4. Richard Epstein’s Work
The theory of Richard A Epstein repre-
sents one of the only attempts to present 
a coherent rationale for “partial” takings 
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which he presented in his 1985 book Tak-
ings: Private Property and the Power of 
Eminent Domain40.
Richard A. Epstein has been a Profes-
sor at Law at the University of Chicago 
since 1972. He is a strong defender of 
the minimal regulation of the state, and is 
considered by some people as one of the 
“most influential legal thinkers in legal 
academia41.
For Epstein, partial takings occur when 
any of the incidents of the right of proper-
ty are deprived, e.g. (i) possession, (ii) use 
and/or (iii) disposition42. According to his 
theory, every part of the bundle of owner-
ship is protected and cannot be adversely 
affected.  According to Epstein:
“The protection afforded by the eminent 
domain clause to each part of an endow-
ment of private property is equal to the 
protection it affords the whole-no more 
and no less…Let the government remove 
any of the incidents of ownership, let di-
minish the rights of the owner in any fash-
ion, then it has prima facie brought itself 
within the scope of the eminent domain 
clause…43”
In this regard, the state host of the invest-
ment cannot remove or diminish any of 
the incidents of the ownership, no matter 
how small is the alteration44.
Epstein’s theory is based on the Lockean 
theory of representational government 
according to which government does not 
have ipso facto rights. It only has those 
rights derived from the group of people it 
represents and the rights acquired by the 
state can never be above the rights of the 
individuals45. Considering that nobody 
has the right to destroy or take away the 
life or property of another, likewise the 
state does not have the right to take prop-
erty46. For Locke, the status of property 
as a fundamental right was derived from 
the fact that whenever someone “makes 
something with their own labour, he adds 
to the object a part of himself and ac-
quires property rights over it47.” As Locke 
himself put it:
“Every man has property in his own 
person…The labour of his body…[is] 
properly his.  Whatsoever then he re-
moves out of the state that nature has 
provided...he hath mixed his labour 
with and joined to it something that 
is his own, and thereby makes his 
property48”.
This principle was incorporated into the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States (no doubt influenced by 
King George III’s interference with set-
tlers’ rights) preventing the government 
from depriving its citizens of “life, liberty 
and property without due process of law, 
nor shall property be taken for public use 
without just compensation49”.
Epstein sets out the circumstances when 
the incidents of property, are diminished 
and therefore a partial taking happens:
-  When a government regulation lim-
its the owner’s right to sell his goods, 
even though his ownership rights are 
unaffected50.
-  When the government interferes with 
and affects the expectation of renew-
ing a lease51. 
-  When contract rights are infringed by 
governmental regulation52. Contract 
rights are property interests and there-
fore protected.
-  When government restricts the num-
ber of working hours and minimum 
wages. This regulation affects the 
right of disposition in voluntary trans-
actions53.
85The ConCepT of “IndIreCT exproprIaTIon”, ITs appearanCe In The InTernaTIonal 
sysTem and ITs effeCTs In  The regulaTory aCTIvITy of governmenTs
ISSN 1657-8953Civilizar 11 (21): 77-100, julio-diciembre de 2011
-  When government regulates rates 
such as transport54.
-  When the government imposes taxes 
for reasons other than for a public 
purpose or permissible government 
regulatory activity55. Taxes imposed 
on a specific community, or on par-
ticular goods and services require 
special analysis to determine if there 
is a taking56.
-  When a government imposes taxes 
designed to raise funds for welfare 
purposes57.
-  When the government regulates the 
use of land58.
-  When a government passes new insol-
vency and bankruptcy legislation.
-  When a government issues environ-
mental regulations (except when the 
state is acting under its police power 
and tries to prevent situations that 
threaten the community such as water 
pollution and discharge of toxic sub-
stances)59.
According to Epstein, exceptions to the 
general rule (that there shall be no expropria-
tion without compensation) are only applicable 
when the state uses its police power60 to protect 
society from common threats61.  
Epstein’s theory of partial takings is radi-
cal. For him, any governmental action which 
could affect any of the incidents of property 
rights would amount to an indirect expropria-
tion.  
Thus, in the international context, his the-
ory would mean that governments would and 
should have to pay compensation if their at-
tempts to regulate their domestic affairs had an 
adverse affect on a foreign investor’s ability to 
use, dispose or profit from his property.  Epstein 
claimed in his book how critical his theory was, 
saying: ´It will be said that my position invali-
dates much of the twentieth century legislation, 
and so it does’62. 
3. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)
NAFTA was the first multilateral Free 
Trade Agreement that used BITs- like clauses in 
a chapter of investment protection (Chapter 11), 
becoming an important international agreement 
model worldwide for the defenders of free trade 
and foreign investments63. 
Article 1110 of the Chapter 11 of NAFTA 
provides that:
“No Party may directly or indirectly na-
tionalize or expropriate an investment of an in-
vestor of another Party in its territory or take 
a measure tantamount to nationalization or ex-
propriation of such an investment (“expropria-
tion”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law 
and Article 1105(1); and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accor-
dance with paragraphs 2 through 6.” 
As mentioned before, this formulation 
very much mirrors the provision in FTACUS. 
The development  this time, is that it appears in 
a multilateral, rather than a bilateral treaty.  
Article 1110 gained international impor-
tance when Methanex sued the government of 
the United States on the grounds of breaching 
NAFTA provision, specifically arguing indi-
rect expropriation. It was at that moment when 
people started to become aware of the power 
given to multinationals under those agreements 
and as Daniel Price mentions: “The breadth of 
coverage and the strength of the disciplines [in 
Chapter 11] exceed those found in any bilateral 
or multilateral instrument to which the United 
States is a party”64. 
However, the phenomenon was not new 
or unexpected, even if public consciousness 
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was lagging behind.  According to the Econo-
mist Edward Graham, before NAFTA was ne-
gotiated, there was a strong presumption that 
‘whenever the government enacts a regulatory 
measure, it should compensate’65.
Professor Robert Stumberg explains that 
the NAFTA investor protections “are based on 
a long-term strategy, carefully thought out by 
business, with many study groups and law firms 
involved in developing them. This is about lim-
iting the authority of government”66.
Epstein’s radical theory and the new 
scope of protection it advocated has been said 
to be a very well-known theory by legal prac-
titioners in America at the time NAFTA was 
negotiated67.  
In a telephone interview with William 
Greider, Richard Epstein pointed out that “I am 
aware that what I have said has been very influ-
ential in the NAFTA debate and that, strangely 
enough, much of what I say seems to have more 
resonance in the international context than it 
did in the domestic context …Nobody from any 
of those [business] organizations even thought 
to ask me to give an opinion, let alone hire me 
as a consultant.  I think they should have asked 
me”68.
In 1990, as NAFTA negotiation began, 
the investor protection scheme was already on 
the agenda as one of the main points for nego-
tiation. Dan Price and Edwin Williamson were 
the designers of the Chapter 11 of NAFTA in-
cluding the definition of regulatory expropria-
tion69. In an interview, Price said:
“Governments recognize that it would be 
unfair to force an investor to bear the en-
tire cost of change in social policy. These 
costs, at least under certain circum-
stances, should be borne by a society as a 
whole. Simply designating a government 
measure as a conservation measure, or 
health and safety measure, does not an-
swer the basic question about who should 
bear its costs and should not be enough to 
remove that measure from international 
investment discipline”70.
According to Williamson, the Epstein 
doctrine is the valid application in the interna-
tional arena because the international commu-
nity has to protect property rights and “exten-
sive environmental regulation may still involve 
a taking”71.
4. Indirect expropriation and public 
policy.
The protection of property against indi-
rect expropriation in BITs and FTAs with BIT-
like provisions can pose a threat to the capacity 
of states to regulate, especially in those areas of 
public interest such as environmental law, hu-
man rights, labour and taxes.
The huge amounts of money that a gov-
ernment might be required to pay for an indirect 
expropriation of a foreign investment can affect 
a country’s domestic policy agenda.
There have been several incidents where 
foreign investors have prevented or deterred 
governments from taking action by threaten-
ing them with possible lawsuits for breach of 
investment treaties72.
These lawsuits are regularly conducted in 
arbitral tribunals.  Although many of their fea-
tures are advantageous for investors, there are 
some drawbacks for respondent governments.  
Many such tribunals (e.g. those under 
UNCITRAL73, NAFTA and Canadian/US in-
vestment agreement rules74) largely operate in 
conditions of confidentiality75 (or secrecy as 
critics would say)76.  Therefore, it is not pos-
sible for citizens of the host state who might be 
affected to know exactly how many claims are 
filed against governments, what the claims are 
and what the financial implications are.
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In this sense, Guardiola-Rivera  high-
lights that these tribunals are often located off-
shore and are adjudicated in front of privately 
appointed arbitrators. Therefore they may act as 
a means of bypassing national courts, again re-
moving the oversight and participation of local 
populations77. Peterson explains that often the 
waiting periods in disputes arising from invest-
ment treaties are minimal, and so disputes can 
be referred to arbitration much more quickly 
than to other international forums (e.g. UN hu-
man rights bodies) which require exhaustion of 
domestic remedies78. He also mentions that the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies79 is 
meant to respect state sovereignty, which sug-
gests that international arbitration is a quick 
way of bypassing the system80.
Arbitrators have sometimes been accused 
of relying too much on international investment 
law rather than applying other sources of law 
that might otherwise be applicable (e.g. inter-
national human rights, labour or environmental 
law)81. This is further compounded by the fact 
that, in arbitration, incorrect statements of law 
can survive subsequent legal challenge. De-
pending on the rules of the arbitration and the 
laws of the state where the arbitral award is to 
be enforced, legal incorrectness may not be a 
ground for appeal and the arbitral tribunal or 
the courts may not have the power to correct 
errors82.   
The following are some  relevant where 
the pressure of foreign investors challenge the 
internal policies of a state and its regulatory ac-
tivity.
4.1. Ethyl Corporation v Canada.
In 1997, the Canadian government passed 
legislation which banned the internal transport 
and the import of the manganese-based com-
pound MMT because of health concerns83.  
MMT was a gasoline additive produced 
by Ethyl Corporation (“Ethyl”). Ethyl was the 
only producer of gasoline containing MMT. 
MMT is banned in all developed countries in-
cluding several states of the United States84.
One of the main concerns of the Cana-
dian government was that research had found 
that the inhalation of airborne manganese could 
cause neurological impairments and symptoms 
similar to Parkinson’s disease85.
The company alleged breach of the ob-
ligation not to discriminate on ground of na-
tionality, breach of the obligation not to require 
performance requirements and expropriation86. 
Ethyl argued that the ban was an expropriation 
of its intellectual property rights and goodwill87.
The government of Canada agreed to re-
scind the ban on the additive, to pay $19mil-
lion to the company and to issue a statement 
confirming that MMT does not affect health or 
environment88.
4.2. Metalclad Corporation v Mexico
This case shows how environmental mea-
sures taken by governments can be challenged 
by investors and how governments can be re-
quired to pay for public policies.
Metalclad, a U.S. corporation operating 
through its Mexican subsidiary received a per-
mit by the Federal Government of Mexico to 
construct hazardous waste landfill in Guadal-
cazae. 
The place where the landfill was allocat-
ed had an unstable soil allowing for easy fil-
tration and contamination of deep waters. The 
location was also an area of unique biological 
diversity89.
Five months after the company started 
construction, it received a notification issued by 
the Municipality of Guadalcazar informing that 
the company required an additional municipal 
permit90.
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The company applied for the permit and 
it was turned down by the municipality.  Ad-
ditionally the Governor issued a decree declar-
ing that the area of construction was a protected 
natural area91. 
Metalclad issued proceedings before the 
International centre for Settlement of Invest-
ments Disputes (ICSID) claiming violation of 
articles 1105 (“Minimum Standard of Treat-
ment”) and 1110 (“Expropriation”) of NAFTA 
by the Mexican Government92.
The Tribunal held that the actions of local 
government and the ecological decree were to 
be considered as an indirect expropriation. As 
a result, the investment made by Metalclad was 
held to be totally lost93. The compensation or-
dered by the tribunal, payable by Mexico, was 
US$ 16.7 million94.
4.3. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
S.A. v. Mexico (BIT Spain-Mexico 1995).
Tecmed, a Spanish company with two 
Mexican subsidiaries, acquired a waste landfill 
in 1996. In 1998, Mexican Authorities did not 
renew the licence to operate the landfill due to 
breaches of environmental regulations95.
The company argued that the measures 
adopted by the Mexican government constitute 
an indirect expropriation and violated the obli-
gation to grant ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to 
all NAFTA nationals96.
The ICSID tribunal held that, in fact, the 
measures undertaken by the Mexican govern-
ment could be characterized as an indirect expro-
priation since the landfill was closed and could 
not be used for a different purpose97. Mexico was 
ordered to pay to Tecmed US$5.5 million.
4.4. Methanex v United States of America
Another good example of the potential in-
terference of foreign companies in internal mat-
ters of state is the dispute between Methanex 
v United States of America which arose under 
NAFTA.
In this case, the government of California 
imposed a ban on the use or sale in California 
of the gasoline additive called “MTBE”98 based 
on the fact that said additive could be a carcino-
genic additive99.  Methanol is the main ingredi-
ent used to manufacture MTBE100.
In 1999, Methanex Corporation, a Cana-
dian company manufacturer of methanol, filed 
a lawsuit against the US government, claiming 
that the ban violated Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 
causing, among other breaches, indirect expro-
priation by the issuance of the abovementioned 
regulation101.
In 2005 the arbitral tribunal dismissed all 
of Methanex’s claims and ordered the compa-
ny to pay US$ 2,989,423.7 to the US govern-
ment102. Despite the company’s claim not being 
successful, this is the type of argument is used 
by companies to challenge and the large sums 
claimed in damages103 has a chilling effect on 
the ability of states to regulate.
4.5. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada. 
This is another case where a foreign com-
pany challenged the Government’s capacity to 
regulate Macroeconomic Policies.  
The conflict arose out of the 5-year Soft-
wood Lumber Agreement (“SLA”) concluded 
between the Government of Canada and the 
government of the United States of America. 
The SLA was part of common macroeconomic 
policy and imposed a limit on the export of soft-
wood lumber from Canada to the USA104. 
In order to comply with the agreement, 
Canada allocated exports quotas among  the 
softwood lumber producers adopting special 
procedures for the issuance of permits to export 
softwood lumber to the U.S. and describing the 
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method of quota allocation based on the export-
ers’ recent export shipments, or on special crite-
ria in the case of new exporters105. 
The Tribunal found that Canada was in 
violation of Article 1105 of NAFTA (minimum 
standard of treatment) because it treated the 
investor in an unfair way, namely not giving 
pertinent information when requested, making 
threats to impose economic sanctions and caus-
ing the investor to incur unnecessary expense 
and disruption. The Tribunal awarded US$ 
461,600 as compensation to the investor.
4.6. PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin 
Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sir-
keti vs  Republic of Turkey(BIT Turkey-
United States 1985).
Turkey opened the energy market allow-
ing private companies to generate electricity 
and to sell it to the government and offered in-
centives to the companies, including Treasury 
Guarantees. 
PSEG, a U.S. company, signed a Conces-
sion and Implementation Contract with the gov-
ernment of Turkey for a coal fired power plant 
and an adjacent coal mine.
The final agreement and key commercial 
terms were unclear.  Turkey then enacted Law 
No. 4628 of 2001 which eliminated the issu-
ance of Treasury Guarantees as incentive for 
those projects106. 
In 2001 PSEG initiated ICSID proceed-
ings under the USA-Turkey BIT on the grounds 
that Turkey’s “arbitrary” measures did not com-
ply with the BIT obligations to provide fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and se-
curity107.  
In 2007 the Tribunal held that Turkey had 
violated the fair and equitable treatment provision 
of the BIT but dismissed the other claims.  The 
change in regulation was a matter of economic 
policy and the Tribunal held that it was not in the 
breach of the agreement108.   Turkey was ordered 
to pay to PSEG the sum of US$9,061,479.34 in 
respect of the amount invested in the project and 
65% of the arbitration fees109. 
4.7. South Africa- Mineral and Petro-
leum Act (MRDA) of 2002
In South Africa, the Mineral and Petro-
leum Act (MRDA) of 2002 transferred all pri-
vate rights in the country’s mineral wealth to 
the State.  The government would then fairly 
distribute licences for the exploitation. This Act 
was enacted under the Black Economic Em-
powerment (BEE) programme which is a race-
based affirmative action measure110. 
Various mineral and oil industry corpora-
tions warned the South African government that 
the measure could violate the BITs executed 
by and between UK and Belgium and Luxem-
bourg111.  Italian investors, with the support of 
the Italian government, initiated an arbitration 
claim against South African under the terms of 
the investment protection treaty with Italy112. 
The South African government after various 
consultations with the industry stopped any fur-
ther such reforms113.
In a similar context in South Africa and 
as stated by the Report of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, the Act 36 of 1998 
(National Water Act of the Republic of South 
Africa) was intended to create favourable treat-
ment for national racial minorities (even over 
foreign investors) when applying for water li-
cences.  The aim of this law was to promote 
equality and diminish the negative effects of the 
discriminatory policies that were previously in 
place.  However and despite its good intentions, 
the Act risks violating the national treatment 
provisions of BITs114.
The cases mentioned above are few ex-
amples among the huge number of known and 
unknown115 arbitration cases where foreign in-
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vestors have challenged the capacity of regula-
tion of states due to regulatory takings.
The compensation payable might dis-
courage states from regulating, protecting and 
improving rights such as housing, education, 
cultural life, food, health, environment, and 
common cultural heritage (which are second 
and third generation human rights)116.
Developing states could be prevented 
from implementing important, large-scale pro-
grammes such as agrarian reform, land redis-
tribution, and protection of indigenous land 
rights117.
Despite the number of different arbitra-
tions, there are no definitive rules that provide 
total certainty to states as to when a measure 
will be a regulatory taking or not. The case by 
case approach which currently subsists will 
continue as the way to identify what is an indi-
rect expropriation.
Conclusions 
BITs and FTAs with investor protection 
chapters have become important tools for pro-
tecting foreign investments against government 
actions.
The scope of protection has shifted from 
direct to indirect expropriation, whether partial 
or total.  Protection from indirect expropriation 
means that a foreign investor will be entitled 
to compensation for economic loss caused by 
a governmental action that interferes with his 
property rights so as to diminish the value of 
or the revenue from his investment.  Such gov-
ernment measures need not be physical seizure 
of the investor’s assets – that would be direct 
expropriation. 
This “new” protection against indirect ex-
propriation gained importance worldwide with 
the lawsuits filed by investors against govern-
ments under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.  
However, the concept of indirect expro-
priation as set out in chapter 11 of NAFTA and 
the interpretation given to it by arbitral tribu-
nals has developed through several important 
cases since 1838.
Since the 1950s, there have been abortive 
attempts to codify protections for foreign prop-
erty and all these sought to include an explicit 
protection against indirect expropriation.
Indirect expropriation was expressly in-
cluded in the US Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Program of 1980 and the Free Trade Agreement 
of Canada and the United States of 1988.
The radical theory of Richard A. Epstein 
of partial takings had important relevance in 
the introduction of the term in the chapter 11 of 
NAFTA and in the approach given by lawyers 
and by arbitration tribunals deciding lawsuits of 
investors against states.  
Thus, NAFTA included protection against 
indirect expropriation which had a potentially 
wider scope.  Although NAFTA could be said to 
be simply a logical progression in the evolution 
of indirect expropriation, it marked a new era 
where international corporations may be able to 
limit or deter the exercise of regulatory powers 
by states.
The protection against indirect expropria-
tion allows investors to challenge the regulatory 
activity of states in areas of public interest such 
as  macro-economic policies, human rights, en-
vironment, labour and law taxes
In recent cases, corporations have al-
leged indirect expropriation in relation to envi-
ronmental regulations, the banning of harmful 
commercial substances, land redistribution un-
der racial equality programmes, or denial by a 
local municipality of permission to build.
However, identifying which regulatory 
policies would or would not constitute an indi-
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rect expropriation, where the state would have 
to pay compensation, is still not clear and the 
distinction can only be drawn on a case by case 
basis.
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free 
Trade Agreements with BIT-Like provisions 
encroach on the sovereignty of states, espe-
cially of developing countries, in that they can 
challenge internal public policies. 
States should negotiate BITs carefully, 
without being blinded by the promise of foreign 
investment, and give consideration to the unin-
tended and possibly undesirable consequences 
that they could bring.
The international community should take 
steps to reform the current system for the pro-
tection of international investments.  This might 
help to even up the unequal bargaining positions 
of developed and developing countries when 
negotiating BITs.  It may also provide clarity on 
investment protection provisions and, most im-
portantly, strike a better balance between com-
pensable takings and legitimate governmental 
regulation in the public interest.   
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